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Abstract
To what extent can one remain faithful to the intended meaning of an “other” 
in interpretation? To what degree is it possible to determine what a speaker/author 
truly meant? Do the interpreter’s own projections always obscure understanding? 
Traditional methods of interpretation tend to focus on “original intent,” while a 
Gadamerian approach differs. So, which method is the most phenomenologically 
accurate, and is one more ethical? Regardless of one’s academic interests, these 
distinct methods lead to different everyday consequences. For instance, how often 
is it said that someone has been misunderstood, that his words have been taken out 
of context? Does interpretation ultimately depend on the intentions of an author/
speaker, or does language have an autonomy of its own? I hope to explore such 
questions here and defend a Gadamerian approach.
Key Words
Interpretation, Traditional methods of interpretation, Gadamer, Soffer.
When it comes to interpreting or understanding the words of another, 
to what extent can one remain faithful to the intended meaning? Whether 
reading a text or engaging in dialogue, to what degree is it possible to discern 
what a speaker or author truly meant? Do the interpreter’s own projections 
preclude and obscure understanding, or can they facilitate and enhance it? 
Revista Internacional de
Fenomenología y Hermenéutica ALEA 
38
A
LE
A 
N
º 
8 
(2
01
0)
 P
ÁG
S 
29
-7
6
There are traditional methods of interpretation that focus on “empathy” and 
“original intent,” and then there is the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
Which approach provides a more phenomenologically accurate or adequate 
account and which is more respectful or ethical? Regardless of their academic 
value, these distinct methods have everyday ethical implications and practical 
consequences. For example, how often do we hear someone claim that he has 
been misunderstood, that his words have been taken out of context, that what 
he said was not taken in the spirit in which it was intended. Clearly, context 
counts, but how should those boundaries be delineated? And, does it matter 
whether the “linguistic encounter” is with a text or another human being? 
Finally, must a reader or listener always attend to the intentions of an author/
speaker or does language have a particular character and autonomy of its own?
In order to respond to these philosophical and practical questions, I will 
explore different perspectives on truth in interpretation. Specifically, I will 
begin by explaining Gail Soffer’s “hermeneutics of empathy,” and reflect 
upon the affinities it shares with the traditional hermeneutics of Friedrich 
Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey. I will also consider the objectivist 
view of E.D. Hirsch and the moral imperative to which he appeals. Each of 
these thinkers differs in subtle though important ways. However, all agree 
that understanding or hermeneutical truth depends upon authorial or original 
intent. By contrast, using the work of Hans-George Gadamer, I will argue 
that meaning is not reducible to the intentions of the speaker/author. Not 
only is it not possible to reconstruct intended meaning as it was intended, 
the “prejudices” of the interpreter (Vorurteilen) are significant too. In other 
words, both intention and projection make understanding possible and 
neither should be universally privileged over the other. Ultimately, I believe 
that Gadamer presents a more practical, phenomenologically sound model 
and that it describes an approach to interpretation that is at least as ethical as 
the one recommended by traditional hermeneutics.
Soffer claims that, “[o]ne function of Gadamer’s analysis of language is 
to distance hermeneutical Verstehen from the Romantic/Diltheyan notion of 
Einfühlung and to establish it as Einverständis: coming to an agreement about 
the matters under discussion”.1 She also criticizes Gadamer for making Spiel 
or “play” the model for language and understanding, arguing that he ignores 
1  Soffer (1994), 30.
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what is essential to conversation or textual interpretation -- namely, “empathy” 
(Einfühlung) and respect for intended meaning.
The model of language as Spiel is phenomenologically inadequate 
in the case of living dialogue, and (...) it is the traditional 
hermeneutics of Einfühlung (...) that consistently conceives of the 
relation between an interpreter and his text according to the model 
of a linguistic encounter between persons. Gadamer, by contrast, 
tends to do the reverse.2
In addition, Soffer insists that there are disturbing ethical consequences if 
one accepts the Spiel paradigm. In particular, she argues that he “recasts the 
‘I-Thou’ relation” in such a way that it has “only limited validity”; whereas a 
hermeneutics of empathy is more “humanistic”. So, what kind of method does 
she prefer and why? And, how does this approach avoid the ethical pitfalls 
with which she is most concerned?
Soffer argues that it is “traditional hermeneutics” that attempts to 
reconstruct the intended meaning via empathy (Einfühlung). Although her 
position diverges somewhat, she is sympathetic to both Schleiermacher’s 
principle of “divination” as well as Dilthey’s account of “historical 
consciousness.” According to Schleiermacher, to understand is, in effect, to 
re-experience the words and thoughts of another or grasp “the thinking that 
underlies a given statement”.3 What makes this possible, especially when there 
is a historical distance between text and interpreter, is “congeniality” or the 
universal bond that exists among persons. “The divinatory is based on the 
assumption that each person is not only a unique individual in his own right, 
but that he has a receptivity to the uniqueness of every other person”.4 By 
attaching Schleiermacher’s concept of congeniality to Dilthey’s historicism -- 
one which still aims to “understand the historical other ‘from the inside out’” 
-- Soffer defends the traditional methodologies.5
On the other hand, Gadamer points out certain limitations of 
Schleiermachean hermeneutics. Although Schleiermacher was among the first 
to recognize the significance of history, his interest was primarily theological:
2 Ibid., 31.
3 Schleiermacher (1977), 74.
4 Ibid., 96.
5 Soffer (1992), 247.
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He sought to teach how speech and a written tradition were to be 
understood, because theology was concerned with one particular 
tradition, the biblical. [His] goal was the exact understanding 
of particular texts, which was to be aided by the universality of 
historical contexts.6
Dilthey, while sympathetic to Schleiermacher’s method, severed 
hermeneutics from its theological concerns by emphasizing the universal 
aspect of human life and history. However, according to Gadamer, 
Dilthey became “entangled” in historicism by failing to explicitly address a 
fundamental problem: “What is the special virtue of historical consciousness...
that its own relativity does not endanger the fundamental claim to objective 
knowledge?”.7 In other words, Dilthey tried to have it both ways which is 
impossible. His method embraces the historicity of the interpreter and his 
understanding and, at the same time, aims at objectivity in interpretation. 
Or, as Soffer puts it, “self-conscious awareness of the totality of the traces of 
history in oneself is impossible, an infinite task for a finite being”.8 So, it seems 
that a fundamental, ontological choice must be made here: Either accept the 
reality of historical consciousness (i.e., one which is imbued with the effects 
of history and aware of this historical conditionedness) as a basic constituent 
of understanding, or continue to strive for objectivity in interpretation where 
meaning is determined solely by authorial intent. Soffer suggests otherwise. 
Instead, she emphasizes the nature of language or dialogue itself and refers to 
degrees of understanding.
It is because Soffer finds Gadamer’s paradigm of play (Spiel) “an ‘over-
essentializing’ of the phenomena”, that she deems it “phenomenologically 
inadequate”. According to her, “language is not simply dialogue, and dialogue 
is not as Gadamer conceives it”.9 Moreover, as indicated above, she believes that 
Gadamer has reversed the natural order of things insofar as he regards textual 
interpretation as phenomenologically prior to interpersonal communication 
rather than vice-versa. If this is true, what does “a linguistic encounter between 
persons” look like and what makes her account more accurate?
6 Gadamer (1994), 197.
7 Ibid., 234.
8 Soffer (1992), 242.
9 Soffer (1994), 45-46.
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Soffer insists that, if we reflect on what actually occurs in living 
conversations, we will undoubtedly recognize that “the thoughts of the other” 
retain an autonomy and significance of their own. This means that they are 
in no way determined by or dependent on the interpreter’s own projections or 
“prejudices” (Vorurteilen). In face-to-face encounters, the “object” and object 
has “a being and a temporality distinct from the being and temporality of my 
apprehensions of it; even though my access to the former is always mediated 
by the latter”.10 Soffer thus acknowledges that access to intention or original 
meaning is always mediated, to some degree, by our own “apprehensions”. 
In other words, any reproduction of intended meaning will be merely partial 
because we cannot grasp the thoughts of another as he himself did. However, 
according to Soffer, there is still an “object” to be understood and it is not 
reducible to the projected meanings of an interpreter.
Differently stated, Soffer maintains a relatively strict separation between 
“the noematic side”, or “meaning intended by the other person”, and “the 
subjective or noetic side” which is represented by “my apprehension of the 
meaning intended by the other”. Moreover, she continues to regard meaning 
as trans-historical and essentially static. “It does not follow from the 
phenomenological historicity of subjectivity (...) that the objects constituted by 
subjectivity, the matters understood in an interpretation, present themselves as 
varying”.11 So, although she does not claim that all meanings or interpretive 
truths are reducible to the intentions of the author, she accepts the fundamental 
distinction between subjectivity and objectivity and denies any historicity or 
flexibility to human artifacts like texts or language. In other words, while she 
appears to be willing to accept the historicity of authors and interpreters, she is 
unwilling to apply it to the object of interpretation or “thoughts of the other”.
Indeed, if the object of interpretation (e.g., the intention of 
the other) presented itself as having the same historicity as the 
interpretation, then the phenomenological basis for the distinction 
between noema and noesis (object and subject) would collapse, 
consciousness would lose its intentionality, its quality of being 
directed at something other than itself, and phenomenologically 
considered, there would be no object at all.12
10 Soffer (1992), 239.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
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However, Gadamer is consistently critical of the traditional subject/
object dichotomy. (Perhaps due to the influence of Heidegger.) Soffer may 
argue that this distinction “cannot be rejected as a remnant of a surpassed 
Cartesian dualism”, but that appears to be exactly what Gadamer is doing 
when he invokes play (Spiel) as a paradigm for language and hermeneutic 
understanding. However, if Gadamer is concerned with truth in interpretation 
that does not involve authorial intent or the thoughts of another, what does 
it entail? Does his model of “play” adequately represent what goes on in an 
actual dialogue between persons? Is Soffer correct to say that, for Gadamer, 
“the I and the Thou become two aspects of a deeper underlying dialectical 
unity”, that the distinction between self and other is treated as “derivative” 
and that this is a problem which calls for resolution?.13 Again, Soffer’s critique 
takes two directions -- the phenomenological and the ethical. I will take up 
the latter more directly at the end of this essay.
E.D. Hirsch also applies the model of interpersonal dialogue to textual 
interpretation by equating the “Thou” of the text with a living human being. 
Moreover, his commitment to authorial intent is even more strictly construed 
since he considers it the only valid aim of interpretation or “objective” form of 
understanding. While noting that Gadamer’s emphasis on human finitude and 
historicity is not unique, he criticizes his method on three grounds: Specifically, 
that it regards the interpreter’s prejudices (Vorurteilen) as constitutive of 
meaning and reduces truth to a “fusion of horizons” (Horizontverschmelzung). 
And, that Gadamer conflates understanding and application instead of 
insisting on their distinctiveness. Although there is no space here to offer a 
detailed analysis of each objection, I will be alluding to all three to the extent 
that they help illuminate Soffer’s position. So, if texts as well as persons are 
construed as “Thou,” does it ultimately matter whether textual interpretation 
is phenomenologically prior to or derived from living dialogue?
Soffer acknowledges that, “a person is not an anonymous text; and what is 
most valuable and productive in a relation between persons is not necessarily 
what is productive in the interpretation of a text”.14 She also admits that, 
unlike a linguistic encounter with another speaker, in textual interpretation, 
“the reader must supply the ‘voice’”. Moreover, “the reader has an ‘anticipation’ 
of meaning, ‘highlighting’ what is written, and supplying determinacy to 
13 Soffer (1994), 34.
14 Ibid., 61.
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indeterminate statements”. However, she also notes that there is “so much in 
the text [that] bespeaks unmediated alterity”. For example, “the language is 
not the reader’s mode of expressing himself, the ideas are not his own, the train 
of thought proceeds irritatingly on its own way, ignorant of the reader’s wishes 
or questions. One feels the presence of the author in and behind the words”.15 
Is this description phenomenologically sound and does it make sense to say 
that conversation with another person is and is not like textual interpretation?
I would agree that there are similarities as well as important differences 
between the two. However, more specifics are needed, some of which will be 
provided below. At this point, she simply states, “the methods of traditional 
hermeneutics (...) produce an interpretation closer to dialogue between distinct 
persons and to an accurate reconstruction of the original meaning”.16 Basically, 
her argument is, even if complete identification with the author is impossible 
(as traditional historicists like Dilthey and Schleiermacher suggest), one can 
still approximate what the original intentions were. Simply put, although the 
interpreter “cannot confirm the accuracy of his interpretation directly with the 
author [as one can in face-to-face encounters], the closed circle of confirmation 
is widened through historical and biographical research”.17 What about this? 
How might the reconstruction or reproduction of authorial intent be aided 
by biographical and historical research? In actual conversation, is it not also 
true that the more one knows about another person the more likely she is to 
better understand his thoughts or intentions? If so, how is this distinguishable 
from what Gadamer calls “legitimate prejudices” or those which facilitate 
understanding?18
Although Soffer is not aiming at Hirsch’s ideal of objectivity, she does 
say that demonstrating a basic respect for original meaning would be more 
consistent with the conversational paradigm as well as ethically preferable. 
This is because it does not depersonalize the author or speaker as Gadamer’s 
method supposedly does. Instead, Soffer remains within the traditions of 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey by arguing that “indirect acquaintance” with the 
author is possible. And that, “through biographical and historical research,” 
one can “yield a relatively vivid apprehension of the author in his words”. 
15 Ibid., 56.
16 Ibid., 59.
17 Ibid.
18 Gadamer (1994), 277.
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According to Soffer, this is not only consistent with living dialogue, it also 
shows that, “the function of language in reading is similar to its function in 
living speech”.19 To stress this point, she shows how the use of imagination can 
also be of assistance when it comes to reconstructing historical events:
When we affirm that something “really” happened in the past, an 
essential part of what we mean is that, e.g., if someone capable of 
perceiving the event had been there, he or she would have witnessed 
it. This claim is in practice unverifiable, and yet it is precisely the 
counterfactual activity of the imagination that gives the experience 
of something determinable and decidable, what “really” happened 
(e.g., something I would have seen if I had been there). [Moreover], 
it should be emphasized that although these counterfactual claims 
contain certain idealizations, they do not posit a suprahuman 
transcendence.20
Is this really what happens when one witnesses an event? If so, why are 
there so many errors in criminal cases which involve eyewitness identification? 
Sadly, there are over 200 U.S citizens who have been exonerated by DNA 
evidence after spending decades behind bars thanks to the testimony of 
eyewitnesses. Thus, it appears that Soffer’s own analogy has undermined her 
position more than it has validated it. Furthermore, when an event is described 
by more than one spectator, or the life of an author is recounted by more than 
one historian, differences in perspective will be more typical than not. Of 
course, Soffer would probably assert that such differences are always a matter 
of degree, but also insist that there will always be some facts which remain 
incontrovertible or descriptions of the event which are non-controversial.
So, let’s suppose that it is at least possible to reconstruct historical events 
or verify experiential data to some degree of accuracy, won’t the same practical 
and epistemological problems arise? For instance, how close are those Civil 
War battle reconstructions to their originals? Not very, I would think. 
Moreover, reading historical documents requires interpretation too and the 
biographical details of an individual’s life can only be presented partially or 
to a limited degree as well. Specifically, some things will invariably be left 
out any accounting, while other elements may be emphasized or exaggerated 
for the purpose of underscoring a point of relevance. As far as providing a 
complete picture of a past event, or the “whole” truth about a person’s life, that 
19 Soffer (1994), 57.
20 Soffer (1992), 252.
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isn’t even possible with a high-tech recording device. In sum, in any attempt to 
understand a past event or the life of a person, one will have to weed through 
various and perhaps conflicting biographical and historical accounts. The 
only way one can successfully meditate between them is to pay attention to her 
own particular interests, prejudices and anticipations. In other words, “Facts”, 
like Platonic Forms, do not “speak for themselves” and neither do texts. One 
must look elsewhere for further data and this too involves making choices 
about where to focus my attention, how to incorporate my own values, goals, 
interests or to what extent they can be left out of any interpretation. What 
else could Soffer mean by “highlighting” if that does not involve a creative, 
interpretative process, one which requires the interpreter to utilize her own 
imagination and prejudices in the anticipation of meaning? Additionally, if 
“highlighting” involves emphasizing certain parts of a work and discarding 
or ignoring others, and not everyone will agree on how this should be done, 
how can interpretation or understanding be anything other than provisional 
and partial? Finally, if the use of imagination is called for, then it is equally 
difficult to see how this would yield an apprehension of the author’s meaning 
“in his own words”. Soffer’s appeal to “imagination” and “counterfactuals” 
serves only to raise further questions and reinforces Gadamer’s position that 
interpretation will always have a creative side, one which is dependent upon 
the projections of the interpreter. Still, it seems worth asking, which kind of 
creativity is preferable and when is the use of imagination legitimate? In what 
specific ways must the interpreter rely on her imagination and to what extent 
should she try to mitigate its effects?
Soffer does not explicitly state what she means by imagination. She also 
does not say how it should be utilized or in what ways it should be restricted. 
Certainly, the arbitrary use of imagination would be deemed illegitimate by 
Soffer as well as Gadamer, for this is more likely to lead to misunderstandings 
or, at the very least, would yield a merely subjective interpretation. When 
Gadamer refers to the hermeneutical function of imagination, he says that, “[it] 
serves the ability to expose real, productive questions”; and that, “the real power 
of hermeneutical consciousness is our ability to see what is questionable”.21 
He does not suggest that questions are in any way “objective”, independent 
of the interpreter’s anticipations or the exigencies of present circumstances. 
Rather, he acknowledges that, “the scholar -- even the natural scientist -- is 
21 Gadamer (1977), 13.
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perhaps not completely free of custom and society and from all possible factors 
in his environment”. This means that anyone who is called upon to interpret 
phenomena, will be prejudiced, that “disinterested” inquiry is neither possible 
nor desirable. However, that does not necessarily mean that understanding or 
interpretation will be crudely subjectivist or capricious. What Gadamer says 
is, “it is not so much the ‘laws of ironclad inference’ that present fruitful ideas 
to [the scientist], but rather unforeseen constellations that kindle the spark 
of scientific inspiration”.22 This is because Gadamer’s conception of truth is 
closest to the Heideggerian concept of “disclosure” or aletheia, and he conceives 
of “experience” as Erfahrung rather than as Diltheyean Erlebnis. By contrast, 
Soffer’s appeal to imagination and empathy is virtually indistinct from the 
Schleiermachean ideals of “divination” and “congeniality.” Nonetheless, 
neither Soffer nor Gadamer ultimately solves the problem of how to mediate 
among prejudices or distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate uses of 
the imagination. Regardless, I believe that the most significant difference 
between them is grounded in their different conceptions of truth and how 
they conceive of “experience”. So, what do those differences consist in more 
specifically?
According to Gadamer, the traditional and essentially atomistic model 
of experience (Erlebnis) will not suffice for hermeneutic inquiry, for Erlebnis 
refers to what is immediately given. Further, although this “givenness” is 
not to be equated with singular atoms of sensation, since it refers to “units 
of meaning”, it is still somehow regarded as an objective unity. So much so 
that, “an experience is no longer just something that flows past quickly in the 
stream of conscious life; it is meant as a unity and thus attains a new mode of 
being one”.23 This is the ontological position-- that there exists simple units 
of meaning, things which can be isolated in the flow of experience -- that 
Gadamer rejects. And, he objects to this for the same reason that he denies 
that truth is propositional, that a sentence can be true or false in itself without 
reference to some context. Just as propositions provide a context for individual 
words, which would otherwise lack meaning, so too is the “flow” of conscious 
experience more significant than a discrete atom of meaning. In other words, 
without a larger existential context, an individual unit of experience remains 
as meaningless as a single sentence which has been taken out of its context or 
22 Ibid.
23 Gadamer (1994), 66.
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isolated from a text. Thus, in the same way that fully accurate reconstructions 
of original intent or past events are not possible, neither is an experience 
repeatable. Not only is it impossible to reproduce someone else’s experience, 
one cannot directly relive or revisit something that she experienced herself. 
(So much for anyone who hopes to be “re-birthed”). So, to the extent that a 
genuine “experience” must always reveal something new, Erfahrung stands for 
those situations wherein one suddenly discovers that what was once familiar 
is now foreign. Experience in this sense requires “openness” and is essentially 
“negative”. However, this is a negativity of a positive sort, for
the negativity of experience has a curiously productive meaning. 
It is not simply that we see through a deception and hence make 
a correction, but we acquire a comprehensive knowledge. We (...) 
gain better knowledge through it, not only of itself, but of what we 
thought we knew before (...).24
This is dialectical experience which, as such, reflects a logic of question 
and answer not propositional truth or objectivity. What then is Gadamer’s 
conception of truth?
As already indicated, Gadamer is not concerned with the truth-value of 
individual propositions. Neither does he assume that the aim of interpretation 
is an “objectivity” which involves some sort of correspondence between the 
subject as interpreter and the object as original intent. Yet, this is precisely the 
kind of truth that is the basis of Soffer’s critique and she remains skeptical of 
any Heideggerian accounts that suggest that “the most primordial phenomenon 
of truth is first shown by the existential-ontological foundations of uncovering”.25 
For Heidegger, seeking meaning is not only the uniquely human mode of 
being-in-the-world, it is a process which involves “covering-up” as much as it 
does “disclosing” or uncovering phenomena. On the other hand, Soffer treats 
authorial intent as a unit of meaning that the interpreter either comes close to 
approximating or fails to approximate, as a truth which corresponds more or 
less closely to the object or “thoughts of the other”. Ultimately, the Gadamer-
Soffer debate about methods seems to boil down to their different ontological 
commitments and disagreement over what constitutes the proper object of 
truth in interpretation. However, if one is seeking to discover or uncover 
what is meaningful or relevant to the here and now, I don’t see how any 
24 Ibid., 353.
25 Heidegger (1962), 263.
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correspondence theory would be appropriate. Thus, I believe that Gadamer’s 
model of understanding (as Spiel) and concept of experience (as Erfahrung), 
along with a Heideggerian notion of truth, allows for a truer phenomenology of 
language and dialogue. Lastly, if intentions are a uniquely human phenomena, 
whether conscious or unconscious, they cannot and should not be reduced to 
the level of objects or propositions. Language too, whether written or spoken, 
is a manifestation of human consciousness. Thus, it has no independent 
existence or autonomy of its own nor is it capable of maintaining a static, 
thing-like status. So, what can one expect of a Gadamerian hermeneutics? 
More specifically, if understanding is not separated from application, and 
projected meanings or prejudices retain their own significance, what does 
truth in interpretation entail? For instance, how can an ancient text be 
properly applied or understood in terms of the exigencies of the present and 
what ethical obligations (if any) does the interpreter have to the author?
To reiterate: Truth, for Gadamer, is not to be understood in terms of 
correspondence whether such is a question of identity and repeatability 
or a matter of degree. By contrast, Soffer seems to be presupposing what 
Nietzsche calls an “antiquarian” view of history, one which seeks only to 
reconstruct the past without reference to any value it may or may not have 
for the contemporary world. According to Nietzsche, this approach to history 
“belongs to the preserving and revering soul -- to him who with loyalty and 
love looks back on his origins”.26 There is indeed something noble and “loving” 
about this conservationist perspective. However, history is only meaningful 
or truly useful to the extent that the ways of an ancient people are relevant 
to the human concerns of today. As stated above, historical events must 
be interpreted, they cannot be reproduced. Moreover, such interpretation 
requires understanding which entails application. Lastly, just as Nietzsche 
is concerned with the degenerative aspects of antiquarian history, so too is 
Gadamer concerned with what are, in effect, meaningless theories of meaning. 
In other words, what Nietzsche says about antiquarian history -- i.e., that “it 
merely understands how to preserve life, not how to generate it” -- could just 
as easily be said of a hermeneutics that merely aims to reconstruct original 
intent.27 Still, Soffer insists,
26 Nietzsche (1980), 19.
27 Ibid., 21.
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‘antiquarian’ historical research would be the form of 
interpretation that most strives to resemble friendship and intimacy 
between persons. The objectifying forms of historicism Gadamer 
attacks would then not be the norm, but the result of overlooking 
singularity, and of separating the interest in the other from 
friendship and fellow-feeling.28
In sum, the fundamental differences between Gadamer and Soffer appear 
to be insurmountable.
If one accepts that facts, or something akin to “phenomena-in-themselves” 
are not directly accessible, it is clear that there can be no objectivity in 
interpretation. If one agrees that all understanding is mediated in some 
manner and to a certain degree, and experience is not Erlebnis, why does 
Soffer continue to insist that original intent is, at least in principle, the aim 
of interpretation? Is it because she accepts a correspondence theory of truth 
or because, like Hirsch, she does not believe that understanding should be 
conflated with application? When Gadamer argues that truth is identical 
with meaning, that the meaning of words cannot be separated from their 
historical context and their relevance can only be determined in reference to a 
particular situation, then the incommensurability of the two methods appears 
to be even more evident. In conclusion, I agree with Gadamer that trying to 
transcend one’s prejudices or projections in order to understand the thoughts 
of another is not only impossible, but meaningless. Doesn’t interpretation 
require a reference point of one’s own as opposed to a view from nowhere? 
How can the words of another be significant to me if I am denied the use of 
my own voice, imagination or am expected to ignore who I am and the world 
in which I exist? Returning to the traditional paradigm which strives to retain 
at least some degree of authorial intent, consider what Gadamer has to say 
about translation -- this too “makes us aware that language as the medium 
of understanding must be consciously created by an explicit mediation.”29 
So, who determines which words or phrases are significant or insignificant 
and how? Who supplies the voice, when no speaker is present, and on what 
grounds? In actual conversation, isn’t it likely that some truths can only 
emerge dialectically, truths which are indeed meaningful though contrary to 
the speaker’s original intentions? Is this always a bad thing? This is where I 
28 Soffer (1994), 63.
29 Gadamer (1994), 384.
Revista Internacional de
Fenomenología y Hermenéutica ALEA 
50
A
LE
A 
N
º 
8 
(2
01
0)
 P
ÁG
S 
29
-7
6
will directly take up the normative or prescriptive aspect of Soffer’s critique. 
So, why does Soffer prefer the traditional model? What advantages does it 
offer that Gadamer’s method does not? More specifically, why does she think 
that Gadamer takes the “humanism” out of hermeneutics?
Soffer argues that Gadamer depersonalizes the “Thou” and asks whether 
this is “the morally best or most ‘understanding’ attitude to adapt towards 
others”.30 Although Gadamer says that his model of understanding, as “coming 
to an agreement” (Einverständis), embodies “openness” towards the other and 
allows the interpreter to “risk” hidden prejudices, Soffer is unconvinced, 
insisting that it overlooks “singularity” and ignores “the individualized who 
in language”.
The idea of the value and uniqueness of the individual, and the 
corresponding value of knowledge of individual persons, is one of the most 
characteristic elements of humanism. Yet this receives little emphasis in 
Gadamer’s analysis: one can “understand” the other in the sense of taking 
what he says as true for oneself without knowing much about who he is, nor 
even learning much about him through this process.31
Moreover, Soffer claims that Gadamer has a “tendency to universalize” such 
that his position “is not merely a characterization of textual interpretation, but 
of human relations in general, and I-Thou relations in particular”. According 
to her, Gadamer has effectively removed the presence of the human being as 
an individual person and has dehumanized human relations. By privileging 
Einverständis and Spiel over empathy, Gadamer is promoting “distant and 
self-centered human relations at best, and misunderstanding, exploitation and 
violence at worst”.32
E.D. Hirsch says something similar -- that is, “we can depend neither on 
metaphysics nor on neutral analysis in order to make decisions about the goals 
of interpretation”; rather, one must, “enter the realm of ethics”.33 However, he 
goes further than Soffer. While she is disturbed by the ethical implications 
of treating persons like texts, Hirsch suggests that words, whether written or 
30 Soffer (1994), 60.
31 Ibid., 61.
32 Ibid., 60-62.
33 Hirsch (1976), 85.
51
That's not what i meant! Projection and intention 
in interpretationArtículos
A
LE
A 
N
º 
8 
(2
01
0)
 P
ÁG
S 
29
-7
6
spoken, are human too. Specifically, the Kantian imperative to treat other 
persons as ends and never as means is,
transferable to the words of men because speech is an extension 
and expression of men in the social domain, and also because when 
we fail to conjoin a man’s intentions to his words we lose the soul 
of speech, which is to convey meaning and to understand what is 
intended to be conveyed.34
He goes on to address his readers directly and asks, “when you write a 
piece of criticism, do you want me to disregard your intention and original 
meaning?”35 Well, since I can only speak for myself, let’s say it’s 2020 and a 
graduate student is trying to decide whether the words written here have any 
relevance to his dissertation. Do my present intentions matter? I don’t believe 
they do. What if, instead, someone is reading my autobiography 100 years 
from now? Assuming I write one, whatever my intentions may be at the time 
are equally insignificant. Rather, the only meaning that would genuinely mean 
anything to me would depend on whether and how my words apply to the 
lives or interests of my readers. In other words, whatever I commit to writing 
is meaningful only to the extent that it is understood by another person and 
applicable to his/her life. What would be the point of linguistic expressions 
that cannot be shared in some way? How could another individual understand 
particular experiences or feelings if they are utterly alien?
There may be certain linguistic encounters which are not conducive to 
understanding. Those which might not even rightly be called “conversations” 
because understanding as Einverständis is truly impossible. And yet, one 
still has a moral responsibility to pay attention to the speaker’s thoughts or 
feelings and, at least, care about what is intended. For example, how could 
I possibly hope to understand how a mother feels after losing a child to an 
early death, when I have never experienced motherhood? How much more 
impossible would it be for me to grasp what it means to have taken a life, 
when I have never been a soldier or experienced combat? Certainly, I could ask 
questions of the grief-stricken mother and the war veteran who suffers from 
PTSD, but I doubt that I would know where to begin. I may attempt to recall 
experiences of my own that are analogous to theirs, but how close would any 
of these analogies be? Clearly, there is nothing to “agree” upon here, so there 
34 Ibid., 90.
35 Ibid., 91.
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is no means of “coming to an agreement”. Under these circumstances, the best 
one can do is listen with care and compassion -- any goal of interpretation or 
understanding should be given up entirely.
Other than limiting cases like those above, where there can be no 
expectation of understanding and only compassionate listening makes any 
ethical sense, I would agree with Gadamer that interpretive activities are 
dialectical. Generally speaking, linguistic interpretation involves play and 
coming to an agreement. Moreover, any truths or meanings that are uncovered 
can be no more than provisional, limited to time, place, context and require 
the interested engagement or projections of the interpreter. Reading a text 
is not the same as living dialogue but it is analogous to the to-and-fro of 
conversation. For example, one strives to clarify what is initially obscure, 
tries out different interpretations, hypothesizes about meanings, etc. In this 
manner, one can be said to be “in dialogue” with a text. However, while 
reading, an interpreter must play both roles and this involves “risking” her 
prejudices. Without some kind of give-and-take, conversation would be a one-
way street and accurate textual interpretation would be mere repetition. Either 
way, according to Gadamer, this would constitute a failure of understanding.
Real historical thinking must take account of its own historicity. 
Only then will it cease to chase the phantom of a historical object...
The true historical object is not an object at all, but the unity of the 
one and the other [I-Thou], a relationship that constitutes both the 
reality of history and the reality of historical understanding.36
And Soffer agrees that Gadamer’s “hermeneutics of application” is “less 
violent to the other” than previous historicist methods,
because here the interpreter recognizes that this always happens 
and so is in a better position to recognize himself in his projective 
apprehension, rather than merely equating it with the other, as 
[those] who live in self-forgetfulness.37
She also notes that, “it is striking how well-suited Spiel is to inner 
deliberation”. In conversations which take place between the soul and itself, 
“the divide between [it] and the other is mediated, the I and the Thou present 
an inseparable dialectical unity, because a single person plays the role of 
36 Gadamer (1994), 299.
37 Suffer (1994), 61.
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both”.38 Thus, although Soffer concedes that play may be phenomenologically 
adequate for “inner dialogue”, she still says it is only sometimes accurate in 
textual interpretation and her primary ethical concern is with, “interpretations 
that read the text against the author’s intentions”. What is most morally 
objectionable,
Is not the lack of concern with interpretive accuracy, but the 
pretension to have grasped the authorial intention and gone beyond 
it. Where the interpreter does not aim at an accurate reconstruction, 
he should possess enough self-reflective honesty to admit this, and 
speak in his own name”.39
This is why she prefers a traditional hermeneutics of empathy. Hirsch voices 
a similar protest. Namely, that “deliberate reconstructions are different from 
deliberate anachronisms whether or not we follow Heidegger, and a particular 
reconstruction may be fairly accurate even under his principles”.40 So, does one 
have an obligation to avoid interpretations which deliberately read “against” 
authorial intent? What responsibilities does an interpreter have to those who 
want to be understood “in their own words”, or to those who would be quite 
displeased if their work is appropriated in ways they had not intended? Finally, 
do we have moral obligations to other human beings, living or dead?
I have heard some scholars say that Nietzsche or Rousseau would have been 
horrified to learn that their works had been interpreted as sympathetic to fascist 
or totalitarian ideologies, that Descartes and Kant would have been appalled 
by the suggestion that their epistemological and moral theories had subjectivist 
implications, etc. Soffer too claims that “Gadamer gives too little weight to the 
wide range of degrees of distortion or transformation of meaning that occur in 
textual interpretation”.41 In other words, she argues that respect for authorial 
intent must be granted at least some degree of authority, so that “pretensions” 
to have “gone beyond it” are minimized if not eliminated altogether. However, 
this merely traps us yet again in that intractable epistemological bind -- 
that is, how does one know when or whether she has “gone beyond” or “read 
against” an author’s intentions? Why not follow the Gadamerian model and 
accept that understanding will be different each time, that new meanings and 
38 Ibid., 46-47.
39 Ibid., 63.
40 Hirsch (1976), 83.
41 Soffer (1994), 59.
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interpretations are brought to light while intentions fade or disappear entirely? 
For example, J.S. Mill claims that, “in the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we 
read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility”.42 Does this mean that Jesus 
was a utilitarian? Since the original author of this is unknown, how could Mill 
or anyone else even begin to discern what his or her intentions were? Perhaps 
this explains why Gadamer characterizes understanding as an “event”. An 
event which, “assumes that the word of Scripture addresses us and that only 
the person who allows himself to be addressed--whether he believes or doubts-
-understands. Hence the primary thing is application”.43
Finally, what if we take Soffer’s I-Thou relationship completely seriously? 
Instead of merely remaining “open” to what the other says, as Gadamer 
recommends, suppose I concern myself exclusively with what he intended? 
What if I aim for total self-effacement, ignoring my own projections and 
interests as much as possible? Would I be recognizable as dialogical partner at 
all? Would such a “dialogue” be distinguishable from monologue? Simply put, 
I don’t see how this depersonalization of the “I” is any less unethical than the 
depersonalization of the “Thou”. As I suggested above, there may be face-to-
face conversations in which self-effacing passivity is the most ethical means of 
comporting oneself. However, I believe that such instances are exceptional and 
that the Gadamerian model holds more generally, particularly with regards 
to textual interpretation where no other person is actually present. Also, how 
could anyone who accepts Gadamer’s method even pretend to have “gone 
beyond” or read against authorial intent if grasping such is impossible to begin 
with and not particularly meaningful in the first place? In other words, if 
the original meaning is ultimately inaccessible, as Gadamer argues, then it is 
equally impossible to determine whether or not one has explicitly read against 
it. Or, if one agrees with Soffer that reconstructing intended meaning can only 
be a matter of degree, the problem becomes one of how much the interpreter 
has “gone beyond it” or when misinterpretation was “deliberate”. To me, there 
seems to be a universal epistemological problem whenever it comes to grasping 
someone else’s intentions -- that is, how can I ever be certain of what another 
intends or thinks if all I can observe are words on a page and all I can hear 
is what he says out loud? Differently stated, if accuracy in interpretation is a 
matter of degree -- requiring one to grasp meanings that are more consistent 
42 Mill (2001), 17.
43 Gadamer (1994), 332.
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with authorial intent rather than less -- there is still the question of how much 
projected meaning is “too much”. In sum, the problem of finding an ultimate 
criterion for objectivity, or an acceptable degree of truth in interpretation, 
has not disappeared. One may invoke such hermeneutic principles and 
epistemological ideals but they are much harder to explain or justify. However, 
I’m going to take one last step and go further by saying that there are indeed 
some cases in which reading against or ignoring authorial intent is the most 
ethical thing to do.
Georgia Warnke, who criticizes Gadamer’s hermeneutics on entirely 
different grounds, refers to Mein Kampf in order to illustrate the point that 
there is danger in even temporarily accepting authorial intent as constituting 
the meaning of a text. “If we have to assume the normative authority and 
possible truth of a work in order to allow for an adequate understanding 
of it, how can we possibly learn to criticize it?”.44 Her concern is that texts 
written for propagandist purposes or those that are motivated by bigotry, will 
be accepted without reservation or question. Again, the presumption behind 
this is that the truth of Mein Kampf would be constituted by what Hitler 
himself intended. This is reason enough to follow a Gadamerian method and 
reject authorial intent as irrelevant. Moreover, if one accepts the “hermeneutic 
priority of question”, as Gadamer recommends, then it is not what an author 
attempts to convey that matters. Rather, it is the text that forces the interpreter 
to confront her own prejudices or reflect on the questions which are raised 
while reading. One is confronted with certain questions to the extent that 
she is challenged or provoked by the answers a text proposes. Like facts, 
which are in-themselves meaningless without further interpretation, so too 
can questions only emerge in an actual linguistic encounter or exchange. The 
interpreter Gadamer describes is one who allows herself to be confronted, 
one who is willing to put her own prejudices at risk, thus making it possible 
to “come to an agreement”. This is what constitutes a “fusion of horizons” 
(Horizontverschmelzung) and it occurs at the level of questioning. As Jean 
Grondin puts it, “adequate understanding can only be achieved if one 
ventures into the realm of questioning. A questioning which is not always 
stated, or cannot be fully articulated, but which is nevertheless essential to the 
penetration of what is said”.45 Therefore, one need never “give up the attempt 
44 Warnke (1987), 90.
45 Grondin (1995), 14.
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to learn from Mein Kampf ” as Warnke says we should.46 Although I have no 
interest in reading this work, it does not mean that it has nothing to teach 
others. And, most likely, if one has any degree of historical awareness and 
human sensitivity, what she will learn from it will be very different, if not 
altogether contrary, to whatever Hitler himself may have intended. This is one 
very good reason for ignoring authorial intent altogether.
Finally, Gadamer says that “the Thou” of the text, though not strictly 
speaking an object, is not identifiable as a person either. Understanding “does 
not take the traditionary text as an expression of another person’s life, but as 
a meaning that is detached from the person”.47 So, if an author’s intentions 
means nothing to me, isn’t it better to appropriate his words in some other 
way? Wouldn’t one be showing greater respect for the work of another if she 
struggles to render it meaningful in any manner she can? Gadamer insists that 
we do no harm if we “forget” the author and what he might have intended. 
I also do not believe that anyone maintains custody of the words he uses to 
express himself, as Hirsch’s suggests. In other words, no writer can claim 
ownership of the language she uses and my expression is not an “extension” 
of my identity. Again, meaning cannot and should not be objectified, so it 
cannot belong to someone like a piece of property can. Secondly, with respect 
to intentions and projections, there is no clear demarcation for where one 
person’s thinking ends and another’s begins, especially when there are two or 
more individuals actively engaged in dialogue. It is within this kind of “play” 
that meanings emerge and are identifiable, and they are not subject to rules 
of logic or physical laws. Finally, the Spiel model of understanding need not 
imply that the players’ roles are insignificant or that they are “depersonalized” 
or objectified. Rather, Gadamer’s point is relatively simple. Namely, that 
truths are disclosed dialectically -- i.e., that meaning is not reducible to what 
is intended or what is projected in conversation; and, that understanding texts 
depends upon what is written as well as the prejudices of the interpreter. The 
paradigm of Spiel is designed to show that interpretation is neither an arbitrary 
process of self-projection nor a matter of imposing one’s own prejudices onto 
the words of another. It also demonstrates that hermeneutic understanding 
is not mere repetition or reproduction. Not only would that render truth in 
interpretation stagnant and one-dimensional, it would be meaningless. In 
46 Warnke (1987), 90.
47 Gadamer (1994), 358.
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sum, Gadamer’s approach is quite ethical. It aims at uncovering an I-Thou 
synthesis by disclosing a fusion of horizons, and humbly admits that this is as 
good as it gets -- he does not pretend to be objective. Even in translation, where 
one’s primary aim is to be as faithful to the words of the other as possible, 
there will always be a “gap” between “the spirit of the original words and that 
of their reproduction, and “[i]t is a gap that can never be completely closed”.48 
Gadamer admonishes interpreters to find the truth in what another says 
regardless of whether it is consistent with what he intended. He encourages 
readers to seek out what is meaningful or relevant by making the written 
expression of another significant for us here and now. This is done not by 
subordinating one’s own intentions or projections to those of an author, but 
by remaining open to the questions that the text puts to me or elicits in me. 
If I wish to make sense of and honor the words of another, I must risk my 
own prejudices but also remember that they serve as the very condition for 
the possibility of understanding. Moreover, a text does have an autonomy of 
its own, so there is justification for detaching it from its author and historical 
origins. This is at least one means of respecting the language of another -- in 
no way is it a violation.
In conclusion, and in contrast to Hirsch, I do not believe we have the same 
ethical obligation to the written word as we do to living human beings or 
conversational partners. However, this distinction is one of degree not of kind 
and Soffer too admits that, “‘violence’ is committed against persons, not texts, 
and the ‘life’ and destiny of a text are not identical to its author”.49 At the very 
least, I see nothing unsympathetic about admitting that, even when I do not 
share the concerns of an author or wish to reconstruct his intentions, I can still 
find meaning in what he says. In fact, it is this kind of concrete appropriation 
that brings a text to life that would be dead otherwise. For example, I do 
not share Kant’s distress over the influence of desire on the will, and I surely 
do not appreciate what he has to say about women generally. Still, I can and 
do find his arguments for duty, good will, moral worth, etc. compelling and 
significant. If nothing else, Kant continues to challenge me (and my students), 
provoke questions and foster discussion. In sum, I believe that the most ethical 
thing to do is to understand or seek meaning in the words of another by 
whatever means necessary.
48 Ibid., 384.
49 Soffer (1994), 63.
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